Nor can it be said that a tacit and yet
obligatory promise must be assumed as having, under such
circumstances, been given by the national assembly, not to
constitute themselves into a sovereignty, but only to administer the
affairs of the sovereign for the time, and after this was done to
deliver the reins of the government again into the monarch's hands.
Such a supposed contract would be null and void. The right of the
supreme legislation in the commonwealth is not an alienable right, but
is the most personal of all rights. Whoever possesses it can only
dispose by the collective will of the people, in respect of the
people; he cannot dispose in respect of the collective will itself,
which is the ultimate foundation of all public contracts. A
contract, by which the people would be bound to give back their
authority again, would not be consistent with their position as a
legislative power, and yet it would be made binding upon the people;
which, on the principle that "No one can serve two masters," is a
contradiction.
II. The Right of Nations and International Law.
(Jus Gentium).
53. Nature and Division of the Right of Nations.
The individuals, who make up a people, may be regarded as natives of
the country sprung by natural descent from a common ancestry
(congeniti), although this may not hold entirely true in detail.
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