political independence,
as the light to owe his existence and continuance in society not to
the arbitrary will of another, but to his own rights and powers as a
member of the commonwealth, and, consequently, the possession of a
civil personality, which cannot be represented by any other than
himself.
The capability of voting by possession of the suffrage properly
constitutes the political qualification of a citizen as a member of
the state. But this, again, presupposes the independence or
self-sufficiency of the individual citizen among the people, as one
who is not a mere incidental part of the commonwealth, but a member of
it acting of his own will in community with others. The last of the
three qualities involved necessarily constitutes the distinction
between active and passive citizenship; although the latter conception
appears to stand in contradiction to the definition of a citizen as
such. The following examples may serve to remove this difficulty.
The apprentice of a merchant or tradesman, a servant who is not in the
employ of the state, a minor (naturaliter vel civiliter), all women,
and, generally, every one who is compelled to maintain himself not
according to his own industry, but as it is arranged by others (the
state excepted), are without civil personality, and their existence is
only, as it were, incidentally included in the state.
Pages:
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149