This idea implies that before a legal state of society
can be publicly established, individual men, nations, and states,
can never be safe against violence from each other; and this is
evident from the consideration that every one of his own will
naturally does what seems good and right in his own eyes, entirely
independent of the opinion of others. Hence, unless the institution of
right is to be renounced, the first thing incumbent on men is to
accept the principle that it is necessary to leave the state of
nature, in which every one follows his own inclinations, and to form a
union of all those who cannot avoid coming into reciprocal
communication, and thus subject themselves in common to the external
restraint of public compulsory laws. Men thus enter into a civil
union, in which every one has it determined by law what shall be
recognized as his; and this is secured to him by a competent
external power distinct from his own individuality. Such is the
primary obligation, on the part of all men, to enter into the
relations of a civil state of society.
The natural condition of mankind need not, on this ground, be
represented as a state of absolute injustice, as if there could have
been no other relation originally among men but what was merely
determined by force. But this natural condition must be regarded, if
it ever existed, as a state of society that was void of regulation
by right (status justitiae vacuus), so that if a matter of right
came to be in dispute (jus controversum), no competent judge was found
to give an authorized legal decision upon it.
Pages:
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145