I cannot
derive from another anything more than what he himself rightfully has;
and although as regards the form of the acquisition the modus
acquirendi- I may proceed in accordance with all the conditions of
right when I deal in a stolen horse exposed for sale in the market,
yet a real title warranting the acquisition was awanting; for the
horse was not really the property of the seller in question. However I
may be a bona fide possessor of a thing under such conditions, I am
still only a putative owner, and the real owner has the right of
vindication against me (rem suam vindicandi).
Now, it may be again asked, what is right and just in itself
regarding the acquisition of external things among men in their
intercourse with one another- viewed in the state of nature
according to the principles of commutative justice? And it must be
admitted in this connection that whoever has a purpose of acquiring
anything must regard it as absolutely necessary to investigate whether
the thing which he wishes to acquire does not already belong to
another person. For although he may carefully observe the formal
conditions required for appropriating what may belong to the
property of another, as in buying a horse according to the usual terms
in a market, yet he can, at the most, acquire only a personal right in
relation to a thing (jus ad rem) so long as it is still unknown to him
whether another than the seller may not be the real owner.
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