Further, it is
evident that a right in this thing (jus reale) belongs in
consequence to me (jus personale), against every holder of it, and not
merely against some particular person. But the question now arises
as to whether this right must be regarded by every other person as a
continuous right of property per se, if I have not in any way
renounced it, although the thing is in the possession of another.
A thing may be lost (res amissa) and thus come into other hands in
an honourable bona fide way as a supposed "find"; or it may come to me
by formal transfer on the part of one who is in possession of it,
and who professes to be its owner, although he is not so. Taking the
latter case, the question arises whether, since I cannot acquire a
thing from one who is not its owner (a non domino), I am excluded by
the fact from all right in the thing itself, and have merely a
personal right against a wrongful possessor? This is manifestly so, if
the acquisition is judged purely according to its inner justifying
grounds and viewed according to the state of nature, and not according
to the convenience of a court of justice.
For everything alienable must be capable of being acquired by
anyone. The rightfulness of acquisition, however, rests entirely
upon the form in accordance with which what is in possession of
another, is transferred to me and accepted by me.
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