Acquisition by the
latter, unless it be a pactum re initum which requires delivery, is
not a part, but the juridically necessary consequence of the contract.
Considered again subjectively, or as to whether the acquisition, which
ought to happen as a necessary consequence according to reason, will
also follow, in fact, as a physical consequence, it is evident that
I have no security or guarantee that this will happen by the mere
acceptance of a promise. There is, therefore, something externally
required connected with the mode of the contract, in reference to
the certainty of acquisition by it; and this can only be some
element completing and determining the means necessary to the
attainment of acquisition as realizing the purpose of the contract.
And in his connection and behoof, three persons are required to
intervene- the promiser, the acceptor, and the cautioner or surety.
The importance of the cautioner is evident; but by his intervention
and his special contract with the promiser, the acceptor gains nothing
in respect of the object but the means of compulsion that enable him
to obtain what is his own.
According to these rational principles of logical division, there
are properly only three pure and simple modes of contract. There
are, however, innumerable mixed and empirical modes, adding
statutory and conventional forms to the principles of mine and thine
that are in accordance with rational laws.
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