Before the
delivery and the reception of the thing, the performance of the act
required has not yet taken place; the thing has not yet passed from
the one person to the other and, consequently, has not been acquired
by that other. Hence the right arising from a contract is only a
personal right; and it only becomes a real right by delivery.
A contract upon which delivery immediately follows (pactum re
initum) excludes any interval of time between its conclusion and its
execution; and as such it requires no further particular act in the
future by which one person may transfer to another what is his. But if
there is a time- definite or indefinite- agreed upon between them
for the delivery, the question then arises whether the thing has
already before that time become the acceptor's by the contract, so
that his right is a right in the thing; or whether a further special
contract regarding the delivery alone must be entered upon, so that
the right that is acquired by mere acceptance is only a personal
right, and thus it does not become a right in the thing until
delivery? That the relation must be determined according to the latter
alternative will be clear from what follows.
Suppose I conclude a contract about a thing that I wish to
acquire- such as a horse- and that I take it immediately into my
stable, or otherwise into my possession; then it is mine (vi pacti
re initi), and my right is a right in the thing.
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