SECTION II. Principles of Personal Right.
18. Nature and Acquisition of Personal Right.
The possession of the active free-will of another person, as the
power to determine it by my will to a certain action, according to
laws of freedom, is a form of right relating to the external mine
and thine, as affected by the causality of another. It is possible
to have several such rights in reference to the same person or to
different persons. The principle of the system of laws, according to
which I can be in such possession, is that of personal right, and
there is only one such principle.
The acquisition of a personal right can never be primary or
arbitrary; for such a mode of acquiring it would not be in
accordance with the principle of the harmony of the freedom of my will
with the freedom of every other, and it would therefore be wrong.
Nor can such a right be acquired by means of any unjust act of another
(facto injusti alterius), as being itself contrary to right; for if
such a wrong as it implies were perpetrated on me, and I could
demand satisfaction from the other, in accordance with right, yet in
such a case I would only be entitled to maintain undiminished what was
mine, and not to acquire anything more than what I formerly had.
Acquisition by means of the action of another, to which I
determine his will according to laws of right, is therefore always
derived from what that other has as his own.
Pages:
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76