But from this it follows at once that such an object can only be
a corporeal thing towards which there is no direct personal
obligation. Hence a man may be his own master (sui juris) but not
the proprietor of himself (sui dominus), so as to be able to dispose
of himself at will, to say nothing of the possibility of such a
relation to other men; because he is responsible to humanity in his
own person. This point, however, as belonging to the right of humanity
as such, rather than to that of individual men, would not be discussed
at its proper place here, but is only mentioned incidentally for the
better elucidation of what has just been said. It may be further
observed that there may be two full proprietors of one and the same
thing, without there being a mine and thine in common, but only in
so far as they are common possessors of what belongs only to one of
them as his own. In such a case the whole possession, without the
use of the thing, belongs to one only of the co-proprietors
(condomini); while to the others belongs all the use of the thing
along with its possession. The former as the direct proprietor
(dominus directus), therefore, restricts the latter as the
proprietor in use (dominus utilis) to the condition of a certain
continuous performance, with reference to the thing itself, without
limiting him in the use of it.
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