Otherwise
it is probable that the natural question- already discussed- would not
have been passed over with so light a tread, namely: "How is a right
in a thing possible?" For, right as against every possible possessor
of a thing means only the claim of a particular will to the use of
an object so far as it may be included in the all-comprehending
universal will, and can be thought as in harmony with its law.
As regards bodies situated upon a piece of ground which is already
mine, if they otherwise belong to no other person, they belong to me
without my requiring any particular juridical act for the purpose of
this acquisition; they are mine not facto, but lege. For they may be
regarded as accidents inhering in the substance of the soil, and
they are thus mine jure rei meae. To this category also belongs
everything which is so connected with anything of mine that it
cannot be separated from what is mine without altering it
substantially. Examples of this are gilding on an object, mixture of a
material belonging to me with other things, alluvial deposit, or
even alteration of the adjoining bed of a stream or river in my favour
so as to produce an increase of my land, etc. By the same
principles, the question must also be decided as to whether the
acquirable soil may extend farther than the existing land, so as
even to include part of the bed of the sea, with the right to fish
on my own shores, to gather amber and such like.
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