In this relation it must have the characteristic of a first act in the
way of taking possession, as a free exercise of will. The activity
of will, however, as determining that the thing- in this case a
definite separate place on the surface of the earth- shall be mine,
being an act of appropriation, cannot be otherwise in the case of
original acquisition than individual or unilateral (voluntas
unilateralis s. propria). Now, occupancy is the acquisition of an
external object by an individual act of will. The original acquisition
of such an object as a limited portion of the soil can therefore
only be accomplished by an act of occupation.
The possibility of this mode of acquisition cannot be intuitively
apprehended by pure reason in any way, nor established by its
principles, but is an immediate consequence from the postulate of
the practical reason. The will as practical reason, however, cannot
justify external acquisition otherwise than only in so far as it is
itself included in an absolutely authoritative will, with which it
is united by implication; or, in other words, only in so far as it
is contained within a union of the wills of all who come into
practical relation with each other. For an individual, unilateral
will- and the same applies to a dual or other particular will-
cannot impose on all an obligation which is contingent in itself.
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