Further, by the term real right (jus reale) is meant not only the
right in a thing (jus in re), but also the constitutive principle of
all the laws which relate to the real mine and thine. It is,
however, evident that a man entirely alone upon the earth could
properly neither have nor acquire any external thing as his own;
because, between him as a person and all external things as material
objects, there could be no relations of obligation. There is
therefore, literally, no direct right in a thing, but only that
right is to be properly called "real" which belongs to any one as
constituted against a person, who is in common possession of things
with all others in the civil state of society.
12. The First Acquisition of a Thing can only
be that of the Soil.
By the soil is understood all habitable Land. In relation to
everything that is moveable upon it, it is to be regarded as a
substance, and the mode of the existence of the moveables is viewed as
an inherence in it. And just as, in the theoretical acceptance,
accidents cannot exist apart from their substances, so, in the
practical relation, moveables upon the soil cannot be regarded as
belonging to any one unless he is supposed to have been previously
in juridical possession of the soil, so that it is thus considered
to be his.
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