This
right is not to be annulled by the fact that the promiser having
said at one time, "This thing shall be yours," again at a subsequent
time says, "My will now is that the thing shall not be yours." In such
relations of rational right, the conditions hold just the same as if
the promiser had, without any interval of time between them, made
the two declarations of his will, "This shall be yours," and also
"This shall not be yours"; which manifestly contradicts itself.
The same thing holds, in like manner, of the conception of the
juridical possession of a person as belonging to the Having of a
subject, whether it be a wife, a child, or a servant. The relations of
right involved in a household, and the reciprocal possession of all
its members, are not annulled by the capability of separating from
each other in space; because it is by juridical relations that they
are connected, and the external mine and thine, as in the former
cases, rests entirely upon the assumption of the possibility of a
purely rational possession, without the accompaniment of physical
detention or holding of the object.
Reason is forced to a critique of its juridically practical function
in special reference to the conception of the external mine and thine,
by the antinomy of the propositions enunciated regarding the
possibility of such a form of possession.
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