The mode, then, of having something external to myself as mine,
consists in a specially juridical connection of the will of the
subject with that object, independently of the empirical relations
to it in space and in time, and in accordance with the conception of a
rational possession. A particular spot on the earth is not
externally mine because I occupy it with my body; for the question
here discussed refers only to my external freedom, and consequently it
affects only the possession of myself, which is not a thing external
to me, and therefore only involves an internal right. But if I
continue to be in possession of the spot, although I have taken myself
away from it and gone to another place, only under that condition is
my external right concerned in connection with it. And to make the
continuous possession of this spot by my person a condition of
having it as mine, must either be to assert that it is not possible at
all to have anything external as one's own, which is contrary to the
postulate in SS 2, or to require, in order that this external
possession may be possible, that I shall be in two places at the
same time. But this amounts to saying that I must be in a place and
also not in it, which is contradictory and absurd.
This position may be applied to the case in which I have accepted
a promise; for my having and possession in respect of what has been
promised become established on the ground of external right.
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