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Kant, Immanuel

"The Science Of Right"

The rational process by which the conception of
right is brought into relation to such objects so as to constitute a
possible external mine and thine, is as follows. The conception of
right, being contained merely in reason, cannot be immediately applied
to objects of experience, so as to give the conception of an empirical
possession, but must be applied directly to the mediating
conception, in the understanding, of possession in general; so that,
instead of physical holding (detentio) as an empirical
representation of possession, the formal conception or thought of
having, abstracted from all conditions of space and time, is conceived
by the mind, and only as implying that an object is in my power and at
my disposal (in potestate mea positum esse). In this relation, the
term external does not signify existence in another place than where I
am, nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment
in which I have the offer of a thing: it signifies only an object
different from or other than myself. Now the practical reason by its
law of right wills, that I shall think the mine and thine in
application to objects, not according to sensible conditions, but
apart from these and from the possession they indicate; because they
refer to determinations of the activity of the will that are in
accordance with the laws of freedom.


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