And thus it becomes a problem for reason to show how such
a proposition, extending its range beyond the conception of
empirical possession, is possible a priori.
In this manner, for instance, the act of taking possession of a
particular portion of the soil is a mode exercising the private
free-will without being an act of usurpation. The possessor founds
upon the innate right of common possession of the surface of the
earth, and upon the universal will corresponding a priori to it, which
allows a private possession of the soil; because what are mere
things would be otherwise made in themselves and by a law into
unappropriable objects. Thus a first appropriator acquires
originally by primary possession a particular portion of the ground;
and by right (jure) he resists every other person who would hinder him
in the private use of it, although, while the "state of nature"
continues, this cannot be done by juridical means (de jure), because a
public law does not yet exist.
And although a piece of ground should be regarded as free, or
declared to be such, so as to be for the public use of all without
distinction, yet it cannot be said that it is thus free by nature
and originally so, prior to any juridical act. For there would be a
real relation already incorporated in such a piece of ground by the
very fact that the possession of it was denied to any particular
individual; and as this public freedom of the ground would be a
prohibition of it to every particular individual, this presupposes a
common possession of it which cannot take effect without a contract.
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