Exposition of the Conception of the.
External Mine and Thine.
There can only be three external objects of my will in the
activity of choice:
(1) A corporeal thing external to me;
(2) The free-will of another in the performance of a particular
act (praestatio);
(3) The state of another in relation to myself.
These correspond to the categories of substance, causality, and
reciprocity; and they form the practical relations between me and
external objects, according to the laws of freedom.
A. I can only call a corporeal thing or an object in space "mine,"
when, even although not in physical possession of it, I am able to
assert that I am in possession of it in another real nonphysical
sense. Thus, I am not entitled to call an apple mine merely because
I hold it in my hand or possess it physically; but only when I am
entitled to say, "I possess it, although I have laid it out of my
hand, and wherever it may lie." In like manner, I am not entitled to
say of the ground, on which I may have laid myself down, that
therefore it is mine; but only when I can rightly assert that it still
remains in my possession, although I may have left the spot. For any
one who, in the former appearances of empirical possession, might
wrench the apple out of my hand, or drag me away from my
resting-place, would, indeed, injure me in respect of the inner "mine"
of freedom, but not in respect of the external "mine," unless I
could assert that I was in the possession of the object, even when not
actually holding it physically.
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