By the former is to be understood a physical possession, and by the
latter, a purely juridical possession of the same object.
The description of an object as "external to me" may signify
either that it is merely "different and distinct from me as a
subject," or that it is also "a thing placed outside of me, and to
be found elsewhere in space or time." Taken in the first sense, the
term possession signifies rational possession; and, in the second
sense, it must mean empirical possession. A rational or intelligible
possession, if such be possible, is possession viewed apart from
physical holding or detention (detentio).
2. Juridical Postulate of the Practical Reason.
It is possible to have any external object of my will as mine. In
other words, a maxim to this effect- were it to become law- that any
object on which the will can be exerted must remain objectively in
itself without an owner, as res nullius, is contrary to the
principle of right.
For an object of any act of my will, is something that it would be
physically within my power to use. Now, suppose there were things that
by right should absolutely not be in our power, or, in other words,
that it would be wrong or inconsistent with the freedom of all,
according to universal law, to make use of them.
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